Wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs) have evolved alongside the development of communication systems, and the integration of cloud computing has enabled scalable and efficient medical data management. However, since the messages in WMSNs are transmitted over open channels, they are vulnerable to eavesdropping, replay, impersonation, and other various attacks. In response to these security concerns, Keshta et al. suggested an authentication protocol to establish secure communication in the cloud-assisted WMSNs. However, our analysis reveals their protocol cannot prevent session key disclosure, impersonation of the user and sensor node, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Moreover, Keshta et al.’s protocol cannot support user untraceability due to fixed hidden identity. To address these weaknesses, we propose a physical unclonable function (PUF) based secure authentication protocol for cloud-assisted WMSNs. The protocol uses lightweight operations, provides mutual authentication between user, cloud server, and sensor node, and supports user anonymity and untraceability. We validate the proposed protocol’s security through informal analysis on various security attacks and formal analysis including “Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic”, “Real-or-Random (RoR) model” for session key security, and “Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application (AVISPA) simulations”. Performance evaluation demonstrates lower communication cost and computation overhead compared with existing protocols, making the proposed protocol suitable for WMSN environments.
Kim et al. (Mon,) studied this question.
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