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This note clarifies language policy and scope boundaries in DRC, highlighting implications for understanding model interactions.
This note clarifies the scope, language policy, and falsifiability conditions of Distributed Relational Cognition (DRC). Its purpose is to reduce category-slip risk: metaphorical or phenomenological descriptions of sustained human–model interaction should not be misread as ontological claims about model inner states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, consciousness, or persistent memory). The document establishes: Scope boundaries (what DRC does not claim), a language policy requiring translation of anthropomorphic shorthand into technical framings (behavioral, optimization, representational, mechanistic), the positive claims DRC makes about interaction-level regularities under sustained coupling conditions, and explicit revision triggers (null effects, artifact-only explanations, non-reproducibility, or dominant confounds). This clarification does not add new experimental results. It is intended as a companion reference for readers discussing DRC in research, product design, and policy contexts.
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Ibrahim José Jamhour (2026) studied this question.
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