Abstract In Germany, whistleblowing was only regulated and institutionalized after a long, tough political debate. This transpired solely due to the country’s obligation to comply with EU law and its legal obligation to implement EU Directive 2019/1937. As a result, structures were created to stimulate external whistleblowing and to use these new mechanisms as a central instrument of corporate control. The extent to which this concept is being realized in practice is the subject of the present article. A thorough examination of the reports received by the central German reporting body shows that only few corporate crimes have been detected and sanctioned through external whistleblowing so far. Limited willingness to report, competition with internal reporting systems, as well as intensive protection of the confidentiality of whistleblowers, are some of the main reasons for this situation as suggested by the present study. Consequently, legal policy expectations towards external whistleblowing should be adapted.
Ralf Kölbel (Thu,) studied this question.