The transportation sector is a major contributor to global carbon emissions; however, the high costs of infrastructure and equipment present significant barriers to effective emission reduction. As a market‐based mechanism, carbon trading improves the efficiency of emission reductions and facilitates the integration of the transportation sector into the global carbon mitigation framework. Incorporating land–sea intermodal strategic corridors into the carbon‐trading market remains a critical challenge, particularly due to insufficiently explored game‐theoretic mechanisms between governments and liner companies. This study develops an integrated theoretical model combining evolutionary game theory with multiround auctions, uncovering the dynamic strategic interactions between governments and shipping companies in carbon trading. It provides a novel analytical framework and an empirical basis for carbon quota allocation in the New Western Land–Sea Corridor. The main findings are as follows: (1) government intervention is essential for achieving optimal cooperation between governments and liner companies; (2) under government intervention, the optimal number of carbon quota auction rounds is 10; and (3) factors such as carbon quota levels, subsidy amounts, and penalties significantly influence the game outcomes, with carbon quotas being crucial for ensuring the smooth operation of carbon trading. These findings not only address the challenges of integrating carbon‐trading mechanisms within the land–sea transport corridor but also offer transferable insights for policy design in similar global corridors (e.g., the Trans‐European Transport Network (TEN‐T) and the International North–South Transport Corridor), underscoring the necessity of synergistic integration between market mechanisms and government regulation.
Chen et al. (2026) studied this question.