Abstract In this paper, I attempt to interpret Kant’s early reported thesis that the historical practice of senicide (i.e., killing the elderly) among certain Inuit communities constituted a ‘loving service’ and was ‘to some degree justified’ insofar as it was carried out to prevent one’s parents from facing a ‘more ignominious death’. On my interpretation, Kant’s verdict on Inuit senicide sheds new light on a core idea within his mature ethics – that persons are obligated to preserve themselves for as long as they remain a subject of duty. As I argue, Kant’s verdict implies that those subject to senicide were no longer bound by the duty of self-preservation insofar as they were no longer able to live as persons with inviolable moral dignity. If my argument holds, this invites further exploration of the relationship between Kant’s notion of dignity and the duty of self-preservation in the broader context of end-of-life decision-making.
Leon Van Rijsbergen (Tue,) studied this question.