This preprint introduces Cryptographically Self-Verifying Systems (CSVS), a system-level design pattern for high-stakes digital processes requiring confidentiality until disclosure, integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation under fully adversarial backend conditions. CSVS replaces institutional trust with cryptographic evidence, enabling any third party to verify correctness post hoc using only publicly observable artifacts. A central contribution is backend blindness: even a fully malicious backend cannot access or distinguish protected payloads prior to authorized disclosure, enforced by the semantic security of hybrid encryption. We formalize CSVS under a fully adversarial backend model, prove security properties from standard cryptographic assumptions, and introduce low-overhead verifiable relative temporal ordering without trusted clocks, append-only logs, or verifiable delay functions. The paper evaluates security, performance, and limitations, and demonstrates applicability through case studies in vulnerability disclosure, regulatory compliance, and research integrity.
Juan Rodríguez Monti (Wed,) studied this question.