Abstract:This paper demonstrates that the traditional distinction between descriptive facts (“is”)and prescriptive values (“ought”) collapses under the account of agency developed in theNeo‐Pre‐Platonic Naturalism (NPN) framework. I argue that epistemic truth and ethical good-ness are not merely correlated but necessarily isomorphic—to deny their identity is to embracea metaphysical contradiction that would make life impossible. Central to this argument is theconcept of Hormē (Ὁρμή): the constitutive drive for life to survive the lawful structure of reality(Logos) by changing causal flow to aid survival and flourish. Drawing on this foundation, Iformalize: Theorem T4: Ethical Isomorphism: epistemic error and ethical vice are func-tionally identical states of misalignment between an agent’s models/actions and thelawful constraints of reality (the Logos).After deriving T4 from T6 (the Life‐Agency Isomorphism) and the First Principles of NPN, I showhow this isomorphism: (1) dissolves Hume’s is/ought gap by showing that for living agents, tobe is to ought to navigate successfully, (2) provides objective but relational ethical standardsgrounded in constitutive striving rather than social convention or divine command, (3) explainsmoral disagreement as navigational disagreement about the structure of reality, and (4) unifiesvirtue epistemology with virtue ethics under a single navigational paradigm.1 The result is afully naturalistic ethics that is continuous with biology, physics, and epistemology, resolvinglong‐standing metaethical puzzles while providing practical guidance for ethical deliberation.Keywords: ethical isomorphism, is/ought problem, naturalistic ethics, navigation, Hormē, Logos,virtue, metaethics, epistemology, moral realism, Hume, Neo‐Pre‐Platonic Naturalism
Eli Adam Deutscher (Thu,) studied this question.