The Truth Without Metaphysics: Ontological Logic and Causal Interaction

This paper develops a unified framework for clarifying the role of truth by explicitly separating its abstract and empirical uses and grounding each in an appropriate foundational structure. In the abstract domain, truth is reinterpreted ontologically: logical practice is understood as governing existence and non-existence within abstract space, where consistency and contradiction determine admissibility. Classical logic is not replaced but reinterpreted to make explicit its non-linguistic, existence-based commitments. In the empirical domain, causal interaction is identified as the defining feature of empirical reality, and empirical truth is treated as an evaluative status assigned to representations according to their success in tracking causal processes. Empirical truth is shown to be downstream of empirical existence, epistemic capacity, and representation, and is distinguished from belief, certainty, consensus, and usefulness. Domain-relativity, approximation, fallibility, and revision are articulated as structural features of empirical inquiry rather than defects of truth. By separating ontological logic from causal interaction while integrating both within a single coherent framework, the paper resolves persistent confusions between existence, truth, representation, and causation, and clarifies how truth is legitimately used without granting it metaphysical or generative authority.