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Demonstrates limited nondeterministic security in cryptography, suggesting a new approach to foundational problems.
Nondeterministic reductions have yielded powerful results in the theory of computational complexity, yet are effectively useless in a cryptographic context. The reason for this is simple, a nondeterministic polynomial time adversary can trivially break almost any cryptographic primitive by simply guessing the "key." In order to use this powerful nondeterministic tool kit in the cryptographic context, we initiate the study of cryptography against adversaries with limited nondeterminism: polynomial time nondeterministic algorithms that are restricted to just a few bits of nondeterminism. We demonstrate that limited nondeterministic security is sufficient to prove two foundational results that have eluded our grasp for decades: dream hardness amplification, and extracting ω(log n) hardcore bits.
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Ball et al. (2026) studied this question.
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