Revisiting how we conceptualize awe: Reply to Friedman and Bonner (2026).

In this reply to Friedman and Bonner's (2026) commentary on our article about the conceptual vagueness of awe (Katz & Franz, 2026), I express my gratitude for their supporting ideas and my appreciation for their newly suggested account on awe that is based on transpersonal self-expansiveness. I also clarify that we listed several alternative approaches to awe instead of only one in our original article. Moreover, I add nuance to Friedman and Bonner's classification of the currently dominant definition of awe as a theory, thus aiming to specify the current problems in awe research to be able to address them more accurately in the future. I welcome the renewed discussion on the conceptualization and exploration of competing accounts of awe and emphasize the need to test the dominant definition of awe to allow for a sound theory of awe. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).