This paper highlights a critical challenge in China: although metro projects are justified by their potential to improve accessibility—a core public good—these benefits are often captured by private developers through the construction of gated communities around metro stations. We argue that local government’s reliance on land finance to cover the high costs of the infrastructure has distorted planning priorities, relegating the creation of permeable, well-integrated station areas—a core principle of transit-oriented development—to secondary importance or irrelevance. Using a natural experiment that leverages national approval timing and local planning knowledge, we identify the causal effect of metro expansion on gated community development in Nanchang, a medium-sized Chinese city that experienced rapid growth in both metro networks and gated blocks over the past decade. Difference-in-differences estimates with multiple time periods show that, relative to control areas, each new metro station induces an average of 3.5 additional gated communities, with cumulative area increasing by 0.15–0.23 km² depending on the treatment year. These metro-induced effects remained statistically significant for up to six years after construction began. Our findings suggest that land-based metro financing may constrain the long-term public benefits of costly infrastructure investments, reflecting an enduring planning failure. We characterise this outcome as a “value-capture paradox”, in which the public good of accessibility used to justify metro construction is displaced by short-term financing imperatives. The study offers broader insights for international debates on land finance and infrastructure-led growth in developing contexts.
Sun et al. (Tue,) studied this question.