Organ markets, distributive justice and the limits of the best option argument

In debates over organ markets, the so-called best option argument is often invoked to oppose prohibition. The argument stresses that for some individuals, selling a kidney would be their best available option. In earlier work, I argued that this argument does comparatively little justificatory work under conditions of distributive injustice, because the option is best only through a narrow comparison that leaves out even better options required by justice. Hendricks has recently criticised this view, claiming that organ markets are always part of the best option, even once justice-satisfying measures are in place. In this reply, I argue that Hendricks’s objection rests on a misunderstanding of the target and scope of my original argument. The disagreement is not about whether organ markets could coexist with justice, but about the justificatory significance of the best option argument under unjust background conditions.