The Bootleggers and Baptists (B&B) framework contends that enduring regulatory policies emerge when morally motivated actors (Baptists) provide ethical legitimacy, while economically motivated stakeholders (Bootleggers) discreetly support the measures to advance their own interests. Interestingly, this outcome depends on the support of both groups. We extend the public choice B&B theory by showing that Bootleggers can, in some cases, operate without Baptists by using astroturfing—a deceptive practice that simulates grassroots support or public opinion to manipulate perceptions. We identify the conditions—specifically, the absence of genuine Baptists aligned with Bootleggers’ interests and a context dominated by Bootleggers—under which Bootleggers are more likely to fabricate Baptists. Using a transaction cost–inspired framework, we predict that Bootleggers decide whether to ‘make’ an astroturf group or ‘buy’ influence and legitimacy by partnering with genuine Baptists, depending on which arrangement minimizes their transaction costs. We then develop a strategic framework for understanding how Bootleggers tailor astroturfing efforts to manipulate public perception and simulate civic legitimacy.
Abdelnour et al. (Wed,) studied this question.