This article argues that Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions developed a historicized and developmental account of cognition in which scientific transformation depends on encounters with what is not yet discernible within existing conceptual frameworks. Drawing on Kuhn’s early writings and archival materials, the study situates his thought within a transatlantic intellectual lineage that includes William James, Susanne K. Langer, Jean Piaget, Michael Polanyi, and Ludwik Fleck, as well as anti-foundational models of inquiry associated with Otto Neurath. Kuhn’s notion of a “fringe of vague meaning” designates a cognitive condition in which non-objects exert directive force prior to conceptual articulation. Indiscernibility is not treated as subjective confusion or phenomenological experience but as a historically situated and socially mediated phase of cognitive reorganization. Scientific revolutions, like religious transformations in domains that permit conceptual reorganization, share a common cognitive structure: both depend on the capacity to dwell within indiscernibility long enough for new structures of intelligibility to form. By historicizing the invisible, Kuhn offers a post-holistic account of transformation grounded in developmental cognition, symbolic mediation, and collective inquiry rather than metaphysical unity.
Mark Nader Basafa (2026) studied this question.