Demonstrates how corporate structures transform moral agents into optimization outputs, indicating the need for revised governance mechanisms.
This paper demonstrates how corporate structure architecturally transforms moral agents into optimization outputs. Individuals enter corporations as Level 3 intentional systems capable of moral reasoning, shame, and reciprocity. Corporate architecture systematically strips these capacities, producing Level 1 optimization engines that calculate expected value without moral constraint. The transformation is not accidental but architectural. Corporate law creates formal separation between individual moral agency and corporate decision-making. Fiduciary duties mandate profit maximization. Liability shields protect individual decision-makers. Information systems aggregate only payoff-relevant data. The result: corporations cannot form mens rea because they lack the neural architecture required for moral agency. Drawing on Dennett's intentional stance framework and game-theoretic analysis, the paper demonstrates three claims: First, heterogeneous intentionality is architecturally embedded in corporate form. Second, this explains systematic enforcement failures across multiple regulatory regimes. Third, effective corporate governance requires mechanisms designed for Level 1 intentional systems, not moral agents.
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Ignacio Adrian LERER (2026) studied this question.
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