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This note proves a scenario where public goods ventures are not funded in econometric models, indicating potential limitations in corporate funding.
Morgan and Tumlinson (2019, Management Science 65(10), 4489–4504) study a game in which citizens first fund a company venture or purchase bonds, and then bondholders and the firm’s manager, acting on behalf of the shareholders, contribute to a public good. One of their major results is that the venture is funded with positive probability in all trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria. The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of economies in which the venture is not funded in all trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
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Eichner et al. (2026) studied this question.
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