Wronging and the individualist restriction

The main difference between consequentialism and contractualism is that the latter does not aggregate well-being when determining the permissibility of an action. Contractualism rules out such aggregation by including an individualist restriction: it only considers the personal reasons that single individuals have for objecting to a candidate moral principle. One influential rationale for the individualist restriction is that it is apparently required to explain how it can be possible to wrong another in particular. I undermine this rationale for the individualist restriction by reflecting on how contractualists must justify constraints against bringing about the most good—requirements, for instance, not to kill one to save five. I argue that contractualism faces a puzzle when it comes to identifying who is wronged by the violation of a constraint. And the most plausible solution renders the individualist restriction otiose in an account of wronging. The upshot is that we get a novel argument for Parfit's contention that “contractualists and consequentialists are climbing the same mountain on different sides.”