Redefines governance to improve decision-making under uncertainty, suggesting a focus on reliable knowledge.
Institutional decision-making has traditionally relied on implicit assumptions of truth-based knowledge, expert authority, and stable epistemic foundations. Under conditions of increasing complexity, uncertainty, and rapid socio-technical change, these assumptions become progressively untenable. This paper argues that institutions do not operate on truth in the sense of epistemic finality, but on reliable and maintainable forms of knowledge that enable coordinated action. Drawing on a post-relativist epistemic framework, governance is reconceptualized as a process of responsibility-bound knowledge stabilization rather than truth discovery or arbitrary pragmatism. Institutions are reframed as orientation-providing systems whose legitimacy depends on epistemic responsibility, revisability, and transparency, rather than claims to final correctness. Author keywords (free terms): Post-relativism; institutional epistemics; reliability; epistemic responsibility; governance; uncertainty; orientation. Internal reference: CB_05_02 (v0.1)
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Andreas Gregor Kawa (2026) studied this question.
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