Contesting Power and Building Pluralist Solidarity

To speak of a pluralist approach to philosophy can seem like a bland call for inclusion, advocating for all philosophies equally without any principal of selection. This can sound mindless, for much philosophical activity can consist of assessing arguments to select the better over the worse. This commonsense understanding of pluralism obscures the militant history of the Pluralist movement in US philosophy, which was a coalition of various groups who shared in common their exclusion from the mainstream of academic philosophy typically called analytic philosophy.1 Pluralists and pluralism in US philosophy today arguably owe their existence to the active struggle of philosophers, from the 1960s to the present, who contested the leadership of the American Philosophy Association (APA), worked actively to support their colleagues, engaged with work outside their home traditions, made space for other philosophical traditions at conferences, and—perhaps most importantly—worked to hire philosophers working in other traditions.To continue thinking and practicing a pluralist approach to philosophy should involve understanding its historical context from which it draws its contestatory spirit. While a pluralist philosophy approach to philosophy can minimally mean working to decenter any one canon or tradition, it originally arises in struggle against the hegemony of anti-pluralist approaches to philosophy. While philosophy is ostensibly much more plural than it ever has been in the United States, it is still by no means established, and remains marginalized in professional philosophy. The struggle against marginalization is not something external to pluralist thought, but is properly a part of it, just as liberation is a part of the philosophy of liberation, or the polis is a part of Ancient Greek philosophy.In this paper, I argue that the thought and practice of pluralist theory in philosophy should be historically contextualized in order to recognize its contestatory spirit. The Pluralist movement was not only a program of pluralizing philosophy by recognizing the value of putting its diverse traditions in conversation, but also contesting the hegemony of the dominant tradition, which maintains hegemony not by triumphing as the most logical or true of philosophic methods, but through operations of power involving the academy, state, and economy. I think that practicing pluralism in philosophy today involves not only theorizing what pluralism is, but practicing it in the mode that other philosophers in the tradition have by fighting for its recognition and material support.2 My argument involves recognizing the importance of what Nathan DuFord has called “solidarity in conflict,” and I argue that pluralism is itself a democratic practice that is not only about contesting the hegemony of anti-pluralism, but must be open to agonistic conflict within the movement about what pluralism in philosophy is or ought to look like in order to be the democratic struggle that it is.In Fashionable Nihilism, Bruce Wilshire gives a historical and philosophical critique of hegemonic anti-pluralism and develops this critique through accounts of pluralist movements that recognized and fought anti-pluralism. There are many events in the history of American philosophy that are relevant here, and they include the advent of the Cold War and McCarthyism, the 1979 seizure of the Eastern Division of the APA by the Pluralist slate, and the rising challenge to “The Philosophical Gourmet” program rankings culminating in the 2011 release of the “Pluralist's Guide” program rankings. Of these three, I focus on the 1979 APA East conference and the Pluralist movement to take officer positions in the organization.In 1979, a group of philosophers from various backgrounds gathered at the APA Eastern conference as the “Committee for Pluralism in Philosophy” and successfully contested the election of officers with their own slate through an irruptive procedural move from the business meeting floor. I draw from Wilshire's firsthand account in Fashionable Nihilism, where he details the events leading up to his point of order demand at the business meeting that a meeting policy be observed. Using Robert's Rules, the Pluralists disrupted the APA Nominating Committee's usual practice of installing who it thought best from its “small, oligarchic clique of analytic philosophers” (Wilshire 55).Though the Pluralists had various reasons for their discontent with the state of professional philosophy, their action was precipitated in part by the threat of removing state recognition from the New School for Social Research's philosophy program on the grounds that its curriculum was too specialized; Michela Beatrice Ferri argues that “the New School for Social Research served as the strategic academic center for phenomenology” in these years, and this may have contributed to the position it found itself in (ix). Among the actions the Pluralists took were the sending of letters to friends, which led to a meeting of philosophers called the “Saturday Group,” concerned with fighting against the New School philosophy department's shutdown (Wilshire 54). Wilshire narrates how the group grew by agreeing to an impromptu meeting at the upcoming APA Eastern conference, with hastily written speeches and invites leading to their rebranding as “The Pluralists.” The group used arcane meeting procedures to interrupt the APA Nominating Committee from the floor in order to elect Pluralists. The response in the following years worked to install the defeated candidate, Adolph Grunbaum of Pittsburgh, and also resulted in the circulating of a letter, signed by previous APA Presidents of the Eastern Division like Willard Quine; the letter argued that the Pluralist Committee “favors the suppression of serious scholarly and intellectual standards under the false banner of openmindedness” (Wilshire 60).The dramatic outcome of the Pluralist Committee's efforts shouldn't let us forget the effort that had to go into preparing its members to act in organized fashion against the established and powerful leadership of the APA East. The subterranean work of the conversations, appeals, defeats, and letter-writing is often much more fragmented and uncollected than the Whig history of the established order. One helpful source that hints at the work behind the Pluralist Committee comes from a blog post on the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP) website, a scanned typewritten document written by Beth Singer. Singer writes that in in 1972, John Lachs suggested to others interested in American Philosophy that they consider starting an organization, and Singer shares that she wrote a letter on 28 November 1972, to Herbert Schneider who was already retired; this letter included the following paragraph: Together with John McDermott, John Lachs, George Kline and others, I am part of a group which is trying to start a new society. We are not sure what it is to be called—perhaps the Society for American Philosophy (or for the Advancement thereof). We want to bring together scholars interested in both the history of American Philosophy and contemporary philosophy which is continuous with the thought of such philosophers as Peirce, Royce, Mead, Santayana, Dewey rather than work which remains within the narrow analytic mode. (Singer)Singer's concern with going beyond the analytic mode itself shows that her concern was not only about inclusion, but also about challenging the practice of how philosophy is expected to be done itself. The issue wasn't primarily about expanding who or what was read, but how we read. Singer goes on to narrate that an organization called The American Philosophy Group formed with various board positions, that there was a meeting at the 1973 symposium of the group that led to its name change to SAAP, that there was a 1973 meeting at the APA Eastern conference, and that the first independent meeting of the group happened in 1973 with the theme of “Human Rights in the American Tradition.”Singer's work is valuable because it identifies the different people and the work they did in the years leading up to the 1978 APA; the committee did not erupt into being out of nothing, but involved labor taken up by various philosophers in conversation. There was surely much disagreement involved among the Pluralists not contained in the historical record, and I think recognizing this matters because it surely made the collective of Pluralists strong enough to carry out their challenge at APA East. In other words, the Pluralists had to build their solidarity out of many conversations that were by nature open to failure or disappointment, for values and livelihoods were at stake. The Pluralist Committee showed that pluralism is something to be fought for, and I think this involves not only fighting against anti-pluralism, but having productive fights amongst each other as to our traditions and tactics.In Solidarity in Conflict, DuFord argues the counterintuitive claim that “while all solidarity is social, not all relations of cooperation are solidaristic,” and the upshot is that conflicts within groups of people working toward common goals of social change are not to be avoided or subdued for the greater good, but that conflicts are themselves part of solidarity (26). DuFord's aim is to show that “democratic institutions and organizations must be open to conflict and contestation,” and solidarity groups that are democratic are of necessity open to internal conflict in addition to the external conflict they provoke to the order they challenge (26). These aspects make them democratic in part because, as their direction can be contested, new kinds of members aren't excluded in advance, and their practices are open to revision through contest (16). DuFord's concept of solidarity in conflict helps to make sense of pluralism as a kind of solidarity across traditions that is built through the conflict among our traditions, as opposed to the suppression or silencing of those conflicts.Erin McKenna's “The Need for Reciprocity and Respect in Philosophy,” which was given as the President's Address at a SAAP meeting, is an excellent case study in the ways that pluralism is a democratic practice requiring difficult conversations over the constitution of philosophy. McKenna's paper touches on the ways in which pluralist traditions are in conflict and have resulted in the erasure of each other, noting that Linda Martín Alcoff's historical account of philosophy's pluralist “civil wars” fails to mention American philosophy as a key participant (McKenna 4). Contesting this disappointing erasure by our allies as opposed to enemies, I contend with McKenna, is a practice of solidarity, for there is no virtue in remaining silent in the hope of avoiding divisive conflict. If what is at stake is a space where none are silenced, to accept a silencing on the way to that space is to sacrifice what one is after at the outset.3It is common in philosophy to speak as though there are only two traditions that are captured in the discourse of the Continental-Analytic Divide, and this trope exemplifies McKenna's point, as it is easy to get the impression that there are only two branches of philosophy. McKenna also notes the erasure that results from one-way conversations in pluralist spaces, as in the occasion of the invitation of feminists from other traditions to SAAP who used their platform to lecture the attendees they had been invited to collaborate with. Across these historical accounts that McKenna relates, the theme is the importance of mutual respect, and the danger of inviting in guests who will not reciprocate. She lays emphasis on the need to remain open while disallowing “aggressive attacks, unwarranted disparagement, and attempts at erasure” (McKenna 4). This vigilant openness is what pluralist solidarity is, but it comes with a danger of dissolution that cannot be gotten rid of without giving up the hope of pluralism at the same time. Pluralism's existence is both threatened and constituted by its openness to other traditions.DuFord and McKenna give a necessary practical elaboration to a particularly compelling theoretical version of pluralism that Darren Hutchinson offers in “The Performance of Pluralism and the Practice of Theory,” where Hutchinson articulates a “polyvocal pluralism” that allows for various theories to come forward and take one over like possessing spirits (103). This polyvocal pluralism is given in lieu of a “meta-pluralism” that would “govern and set the law” for the various discourses it would gather (Hutchinson 103). Polyvocal pluralism is a vision of pluralism in which pluralism is not a matter of unity or dogma, but the coming to presence and interaction of various traditions in conversation both within ourselves and among others. Hutchinson's pluralism aims for a horizontal account, where one is inhabited across time by the traditions and texts one reads, but without an underlying meta tradition. Hutchinson's account does not touch upon politics, and it is important to keep in mind that, as Bonnie Mann notes, “the problem of pluralism emerges precisely and only in historically burdened relationships of power” (741). It is not only a matter of increasing the quantity of canons or methods, but of philosophers working in the profession; as McKenna notes, “what is needed are more voices in the discipline of philosophy generally, and American philosophy in particular” (10).In reflecting on pluralism today and how it can be meaningfully pursued in professional philosophy today, it bears asking how pluralists can unite. How can pluralists come together without feeling that they are relegating their philosophical beliefs to so-called political ones, or postponing their professional lives for service? It is not only a question of navigating the singular Analytic-Continental divide, but of the various divides and their genealogies that continue to proliferate. Professional philosophers work in traditions influenced by the training they get from their departments or advisor, the latter of which today was likely classically trained in Analytic, Continental, or Pragmatist philosophy. Today, then, it is not only a matter of an Analytic-Continental divide, but rapidly proliferating fault lines, like a Continentalist Pragmatist and Analytic Latin Americanist divide, a Decolonial Critical Theorist and Analytic Feminist divide, or an Africana philosophy and Caribbean philosophy divide, to give a few examples. The proliferation of divides intensifies the problem I have introduced, which is how to think about pluralism in philosophy without either rejecting it in favor of advocating narrowly for one's own tradition, or adopting pluralism as a fixed program that effectively takes one away from one's tradition while presenting itself as meta-tradition organizing the others.I have attempted to respond to these issues in part by insisting on the necessity of making this a living question to be taken up in real productive conflict with others: co-workers, colleagues, or fellow students. Pursuing a PhD means putting a high priority on the value and strength of the topics one specializes in, and this is true whether the reasons are encouraged by professionalization or they belong to the desire to pursue truth in the mode that has struck the student as being the most reasonable. Conversations about pluralism can be quite difficult, because they can appear as mere political distractions to others from their work, at a time when every second spent trying to publish, teach, and read matters, given the state of the profession. The biggest challenge for entering into the space of productive conflict with one another concerns the stakes, for not only is it fairly difficult to be accepted into the professional conversation at all via admittance into a philosophy graduate program, but the state of the job market makes entering into the conflictual discussion of pluralism riskier by the year.The stunning collapse of the job market in philosophy and the humanities more broadly is properly a philosophical issue given that professional philosophy is practically the only place to engage in sustained philosophic practice today. The problem is not only the state of philosophy departments, but other academic departments, too, because a pluralist lens recognizes that many philosophers of pluralist traditions are not or have not been housed in philosophy departments. How can there be pluralism in philosophy if graduates do not have stable employment at a university that supports them in providing the conditions to read, write, and contribute to the discipline the same way that tenured professors can, especially professors in established research universities?This problem is exacerbated by what has been called the academic “Great Gatsby Curve,” which tracks “academic intergenerational persistence as the correlation between the academic impact of mentors and that of their protégés” and persists most unequally in philosophy, according to a 2024 study (Sun et al.). This problem, which results in part from the extreme emphasis that philosophy puts on whom one studies with, bears down on pluralism by pushing us to think about how academic lineages influence the traditions we work with. The research one does and one's professional success can depend much, for example, on whether one works on a nontraditional project at an Ivy League Philosophy Department instead of a program not ranked on the Philosophical Gourmet Report. Given that department rankings can correlate with how successful one is on the academic job market, as well as how much financial support there is for research, conference travel, and living conditions, it is important to keep in mind not only the content of philosophical thought, but also who gets to participate with whom, through which methods.There are multiple directions in which to think about the practice of pluralism and the state of professional philosophy. Sites of struggle today include labor organizing in academia, funding sources for philosophy programs, the constant rise of college tuition, the trend of shuttering philosophy programs, professional organizations in philosophy, and the hegemony maintained by elite philosophy programs, but it is not immediately clear what path stands out for continuing to think and creatively practice philosophical pluralism, and this paper aims to invite discussion on this question as a way to work together on what can feel, and perhaps be, an insurmountable set of problems. How do we organize, work together, and continue the fight to not only preserve the discipline, but expand and continue to redefine it, especially at a time when it comes under assault from the pressures of AI, capitalist expropriation of the university, and conservative the SAAP 2024 conference, I had a conversation at a with a fellow American the philosophy department took a to the state of professional that he was not about the state of philosophy, should others he its and will and if he was to another he would another job when that time In one this paper is an to to whom I argue that fighting against department and funding is it, at that others will have the to the conversations at after philosophy conference My are at continuing philosophical conversation with the aim of space for more voices to in, out of for those who who build the made for and who made own in philosophy