Challenges in the Defense Application of Nuclear Energy: Legal and Regulatory Frameworks under the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

As security threats in the Indo-Pacific evolve, the Republic of Korea (ROK) faces critical energy vulnerabilities in its defense infrastructure, necessitating the deployment of Micro Modular Reactors (MMRs). Although international non-proliferation norms do not exclude non-explosive military nuclear use, the 2015 ROK-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement categorically prohibits it. This study highlights diplomatic asymmetries by contrasting this restriction with U.S. agreements with EURATOM and AUKUS, revealing a “normative glass ceiling” that disregards the ROK’s exemplary non-proliferation record. Addressing safety concerns, the study demonstrates that military MMRs, characterized by inherent safety and distributed architecture, constitute “targets of negligible strategic value.” To overcome legal barriers, this paper proposes a sequenced legal approach: first, utilizing an Agreed Minute to clarify base power supply as a peaceful activity subject to Article 14 of INFCIRC/153(corrected); and second, potentially bundling military MMRs into a future U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 91 agreement for naval propulsion. This strategic evolution is essential for maintaining ROK-U.S. alliance stability. • Legal barriers to deploying military Micro Modular Reactors in the ROK analyzed. • Article 13 of the 2015 ROK-U.S. Agreement critiqued for exceeding global standards. • Diplomatic asymmetry identified via comparison with EURATOM and AUKUS cases . • Interpretive approach to the Agreed Minute proposed for defense energy resilience. • Consistency of military MMRs with NPT and IAEA safeguards frameworks verified.