Pension Politics in the 21st Century

The possibility of examining the influence of governments and parties on pension policies has so far been limited by the dependent variable problem in comparative welfare state research in general, and by the lack of valid indicators for capturing pension policies in particular. This study presents a newly created comprehensive dataset on multidimensional pension reforms in 24 developed OECD countries in the period from 1980 to 2020. The pension reforms recorded are arranged according to a modified categorization scheme earlier developed by Silja Häusermann. The present data collection indicates a high incidence of pension reforms that strengthen both the funded and the redistributive nature of pension systems, but also reduce insurance benefits and privileged status rights of public-sector employees. Furthermore, the shortcomings of previous theoretical approaches to the empirical relationship between political actors and pension policies are criticized, in particular in the form of traditional partisan theory, as well as the previous neglect of the authoritarian-libertarian cleavage as a potential conflict structure also underlying and permeating contemporaneous pension politics. The influence of governments and parties on categorical pension reform regimes is then modeled and estimated. Results show that there is no consistent evidence lending support to detectable effects of party family variables or authoritarian and libertarian government positions on various dimensions of pension policy. However, there is robust evidence lending support to socioeconomically right and left governments influencing at least some dimensions of pension policy. The general assessment regularly expressed in recent studies in comparative welfare state research that government and party effects have completely disappeared can therefore not be followed on the basis of the present empirical findings.