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Correlational and qualitative studies explore how attributions of conspiracy beliefs affect intentions to correct them, suggesting strategies for interpersonal corrections.
What do laypeople think causes conspiracy beliefs? In six correlational studies ( N = 2,024) and a qualitative study ( N = 190), we examined laypeople’s attributions of others’ conspiracy beliefs and how these attributions predict their intentions to correct conspiracy believers. Attribution research suggests that dispositional (vs. situational) attributions should dominate lay beliefs and negatively predict correction intentions. Dispositional attributions of conspiracy beliefs were indeed more prevalent than attributions to situational causes, with two exceptions: Conspiracy beliefs were attributed most strongly to influence from social media and misinformation. Attributing another person’s conspiracy beliefs more strongly to social media or misinformation also predicted intentions to correct this person, more so than other attributions. Our results suggest that (a) assessing attributions at a more detailed level than is often done can help uncover yet unobserved nuance in laypeople’s attributions and (b) encouraging certain attributions of conspiracy beliefs could help foster their interpersonal correction.
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Mang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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