In Defence of Second-Order Reasons

Some philosophers and legal theorists believe that certain fundamental normative phenomena cannot be adequately explained without appeal to second-order reasons—that is, reasons to act (or not to act) for certain reasons. Others are resistant to such an appeal. This resistance takes a robust form in the Credit Argument, which holds that, since we cannot act for a reason for a reason, the very idea of second-order reasons must be incoherent. In this paper, I do several things. Firstly, I clarify in just what sense the Credit Argument supposes it is not ‘possible’ to act for a reason for a reason. Secondly, I propose a novel typology of second-order reasons. Thirdly, using these insights, I demonstrate that the Credit Argument is weak at several points and should therefore be roundly rejected. This amounts to a partial defence of the appeal to second-order reasons in the explanation of fundamental normative phenomena.