Automated production lines are increasingly being expanded with Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices, creating complex Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) that connect physical production with control and information infrastructure. However, the convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) layers creates new entry points for attacks targeting communication availability. Most existing studies analyze Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks primarily in simulation or testbed environments, with limited experimental verification of their impact on real-world production systems. This article presents an experimental evaluation of the impact of DDoS and Distributed Reflection Denial of Service (DRDoS) attacks carried out directly on a physical automated production line with integrated IIoT infrastructure during real operation. Three attack scenarios (TCP SYN flood, TCP ACK flood, and ICMP reflected attack) were implemented, targeting Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) subsystems, and selected IIoT devices. The results showed rapid degradation of deterministic PROFINET communication, disruption of the link between the OT and IT layers, loss of digital product representation, and physical interruption of the production process. Based on the findings, a minimally invasive security solution based on perimeter protection was designed and experimentally verified. The results emphasize the need to design IIoT-based manufacturing systems with an emphasis on network segmentation and architectural separation of the IT and OT layers.
Horák et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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