Reconstructing norms as functions

Narváez Mora (2024) proposes construing norms as functions. Her norms-as-functions essentially partition behaviours into two sets: correct and incorrect. I rigorously reconstruct her proposal in terms of set theory and critically examine it. I provide criteria for consistency, completeness, and closure, and connect her approach to others including Standard Deontic Logic. Doing so reveals that her proposal presupposes axiom D and reproduces a portion of more conventional deontic logics. Her norms-as-functions may be understood in terms of Kripke semantics, as direct statements of the sets of accessible and inaccessible possible worlds. These communalities with more standard approaches indicate that hers cannot do without a notion of truth. This undermines her non-cognitivist motivation for construing norms as functions. Her approach nevertheless remains interesting, especially if combined with approaches that construe norms as functions into solutions rather than correctness and incorrectness. I connect it to those of Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971) and Meier (2025) and also indicate potential uses for such approaches in improving the outputs of legal AI systems.