The intersubjective dimension of human dignity—from philosophical theorizing to case law examples from the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract The legal concept of human dignity has been much theorized, and it is also frequently used in practice. However, due to the multitude of different theories and uses, the resulting picture of human dignity is complex, messy, and pixel-like. There is a need to clarify this picture, yet without oversimplifying matters. This article attempts to do so by promoting a three-dimensional understanding of human dignity, with a special focus on its intersubjective dimension. This understanding of dignity is based on a study of recent theoretical accounts of dignity as well as on an exploration of certain illuminating cases from the rich case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding human dignity. The three-dimensional understanding, especially the intersubjective dimension, offers a frame and provides much-needed terms through which different theoretical accounts of dignity and its applications in legal practice can be analysed—the theoretical and practical outlook working together.