Abstract: A recurring critique of consciousness-first frameworks — often framed as pragmatic rather than partisan — is that they fail to "build" in the way successful sciences do. This essay argues that the critique rests on a category error with two dimensions: (1) crediting physicalism with explanatory achievements that belong to empirical methodology, not to any ontological claim; and (2) demanding that ontologies produce predictive track records, when prediction is the business of scientific theories — and scientific theories are ontologically portable. No scientific theory derives its predictions from the axiom that matter is fundamental. The demand for "idealist predictions" confuses the level at which ontologies operate. What ontologies actually do is expand or contract the space of conceivable scientific theories — the range of research directions, questions, and explanatory postures that a framework permits or forecloses. Physicalism contracts this space by ruling out consciousness-first research directions a priori. Idealism expands it by permitting everything physicalism permits plus directions physicalism forecloses. This is the correct criterion for evaluating ontologies. Applying it does not guarantee any framework's success. It ensures that evaluation operates on the right terrain. Keywords: ontological evaluation · predictive track records · category error · scientific methodology · theory portability · idealism · physicalism · research generativity Part of the Return to Consciousness research program — 26 philosophical essays exploring consciousness-first metaphysics. Full project: https://brunoton.github.io/return-to-consciousness/
Bruno Tonetto (Sun,) studied this question.