This article develops a comprehensive taxonomy of failed military tactics from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, arguing that military failure is not primarily the result of incompetence, insufficient resources, or technological lag, but rather of recurring structural and cognitive misjudgements. Drawing on comparative historical analysis across industrial, mechanized, and post-industrial conflicts, the study identifies six interlocking categories of failure: technological overconfidence, cultural and ideological miscalculation, misreading of terrain, logistical impossibility, psychological misjudgement of the enemy, and compound failure through interaction effects. Through case studies ranging from the Crimean War and Gallipoli to Operation Barbarossa, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the article demonstrates how these failure modes repeatedly undermine otherwise superior forces. Particular attention is given to the non-linear dynamics of morale, the strategic agency of terrain, and the systematic undervaluation of logistics and local knowledge. The analysis further shows that reforms and professionalization, while reducing certain tactical errors, have not eliminated these failures due to organizational inertia, political incentives, and inherent limits of human cognition under uncertainty. The article concludes that military failure is a persistent feature of war rather than an aberration, and that recognizing its patterned nature offers both predictive value and ethical urgency for future strategic planning and civilian oversight.
Kim Robin Thuemler (Tue,) studied this question.