Stable coalition formation through bargaining for the preservation of public goods

Alfredo Piria; Atefeh Afsar; Filipe Martins; José Martins; Bruno Rodrigo Brilhante Oliveira; Alberto A. Pinto; Luis Quintas

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107525

February 3, 2026Economic Modelling

Stable coalition formation through bargaining for the preservation of public goods

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Key Points

Stable coalition formation enhances the effectiveness of bargaining strategies for public goods preservation.
Strong evidence indicates that effective bargaining can lead to better management of resources vital for community welfare.
Analysis conducted using game theory provides insights into coalition dynamics in the context of public goods.
These findings highlight the importance of strategic cooperation in tackling common challenges related to resource management.

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Implication

Observational analysis reveals effective preservation strategies for public goods through coalition formation, suggesting enhanced cooperation among stakeholders.

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Cite This Study

Piria et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69a760dfc6e9836116a2e06f https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107525

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Stable coalition formation through bargaining for the preservation of public goods

Key Points

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Implication

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Stable coalition formation through bargaining for the preservation of public goods

Key Points

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Implication

Discussion

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