Research on Spatial Information Network Vulnerability Analysis Methodology Based on Multi-Layer Hypernetworks

As the core infrastructure for providing all-weather, full-coverage, high-speed, and diversified information services, spatial information networks (SINs) possess significant social, economic, and military value. However, due to the inherent characteristics of their network architecture, SINs are susceptible to core service paralysis and functional failure under large-scale targeted attacks or random disturbances, posing a critical bottleneck that constrains their stable operation. Current research on SIN vulnerability is predominantly confined to a single network topology perspective, lacking an integrated consideration of the task execution perspective. Consequently, it fails to accommodate the dual requirements of “network topology stability” and “task execution effectiveness”. To address the aforementioned research needs and challenges, this study adopts a “topology-task” dual-perspective fusion approach and proposes a vulnerability analysis framework for SINs that integrates multi-layer networks and hypernetworks. First, a two-layer SIN topology model encompassing the user layer and the satellite layer is constructed. Leveraging hypernetwork theory, information tasks involving multiple network entities are formally defined, and an integrated multi-layer hypernetwork model is established. Second, based on distinct task types, three categories of task efficiency evaluation metrics are defined, and corresponding quantitative methods for calculating SIN vulnerability are derived. Third, during the vulnerability analysis phase, a novel strategy for identifying and removing overlapping nodes in hypernetworks is introduced to enable precise localization of critical nodes within the network. Concurrently, a pre-attack node hardening strategy is designed to minimize the impact of attacks on network performance. Finally, through systematic analysis of vulnerability performance and critical node characteristics under different node removal strategies, the results demonstrate enhanced network performance. The effectiveness of the proposed method is validated by comparing the defense performance of the hardening strategy across various attack scenarios. To verify the feasibility and superiority of the proposed method, this study designs 5 × 5 groups of simulation experiments with varying network parameters. The results indicate that, compared with traditional methods, the proposed strategy can more accurately identify core nodes affecting the stable operation of SINs, significantly reducing network vulnerability and improving network survivability. In addition, a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of SIN vulnerability is conducted from three key influencing dimensions—mission scale, satellite count, and constellation configuration—clarifying the impact of each dimension on network invulnerability. Thus, this paper provides a reliable theoretical foundation and technical support for the planning, design, optimal deployment, and operation and maintenance management of SINs.