CAN-FD ECU Authentication Using Voltage-Characteristic Hardware Fingerprints

As a next-generation serial communication protocol employed in automotive electronics and industrial control domains, Controller Area Network with Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD) enhances communication efficiency via the introduction of a dual-rate transmission mechanism, yet it still inherits the security vulnerabilities of traditional CAN networks. To enhance the security of node identity authentication in CAN-FD networks—a critical prerequisite for secure communication—we present an electronic control unit (ECU) authentication scheme that utilizes voltage hardware fingerprints (VHFs) as the core identity credential. Specifically, a single frame of data is utilized to integrate the control field’s voltage characteristics and data field’s edges, forming stable and distinguishable hardware fingerprints. We also analyze the VHF offset characteristics under typical spoofing attacks and wire-tapping attacks, and then propose a lightweight vehicle intrusion detection system (VIDS) scheme to identify attack scenarios and locate the compromised ECU in CAN-FD networks. Lastly, we conducted research on and discussed other VHF-influencing factors and put forward detailed specific solutions. Attack tests are conducted under four representative scenarios, namely substitution attack, masquerade attack, injection attack, and wire-tapping attack. The findings reveal that our scheme can not only accurately distinguish between various CAN-FD nodes but also identify specific attack types in real time. In detail, a single-frame node recognition rate exceeding 99% is achieved in approximately 2 ms, and in experiments covering multiple attack scenarios on this six-node prototype system, 100% recognition accuracy for attack types is realized in approximately 500 ms.