Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The subject of the study is the public representation of the June Offensive of the Russian Army in 1917 (“Kerensky’s Offensive”) in the Petrograd periodical press and the related mechanisms of constructing political leadership in the context of a revolutionary crisis. The article focuses on analyzing how metropolitan newspapers interpreted the beginning of the offensive, its initial successes, and subsequent developments, shaping the image of the revolutionary army and attributing a specific political and symbolic meaning to the events taking place. Central to this focus is the figure of the Minister of War and Navy A.F. Kerensky, whose activities in the press discourse were presented as a key factor in mobilizing the front and the rear. Dominant mobilization narratives, as well as alternative and critical interpretations, strategies of personalizing power, appeals to revolutionary symbolism, and ways to legitimize the decisions of the Provisional Government through demonstrating mass support for the offensive are examined. The analysis of printed materials reveals a discrepancy between the declared revival of the army and the contradictory reality, which lends a problematic and analytical character to the study. The methodological basis of the research was a comprehensive approach that combines the principles of historicism, systematics, and objectivity with elements of imagological, discursive, and content analysis applied to the materials of periodical press as a specific historical source. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the fact that the June Offensive is viewed not only as a military operation and an episode of political history but also as a large-scale political-communicative project implemented in the informational space of the capital. Based on a broad corpus of Petrograd press, it is demonstrated that the press acted not as a passive retransmitter of official information but as an active political actor involved in shaping symbolic meanings and models of perception of war and power. Key rhetorical strategies and narratives through which the image of Kerensky as a revolutionary leader, tasked with connecting democratic legitimacy with the function of military leadership, were constructed have been identified. It is concluded that the high degree of personalization and emotional intensity in mobilization rhetoric contributed to a short-term increase in the symbolic capital of power. The failure of the offensive revealed a contradiction between media-constructed expectations and the real state of the army, but at the same time, it facilitated the further strengthening of Kerensky's political position, allowing him to take advantage of the emerging opportunities to shift the blame onto his opponents.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Maksim Sergeevich Volintsev (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: