Analysis of Kant’s ethical principles reveals challenges in yielding positive duties to non-users, suggesting a rephrasing of the formula's scope.
Pauline Kleingeld has recently presented a new reading of Kant’s prohibition against using as a mere means. She advocates an actual consent reading, and claims that her reading can avoid problems of other actual consent readings. She emphasizes that the prohibition “never merely as a means” is only meant to apply to those persons we use. I argue that this would also be true for the as-an-end part of the Formula of Humanity. The Formula of Humanity would thus fail to yield any positive duties to people we are not using. I suggest that we rephrase the scope of the Formula of Humanity such that the never-merely-as-a-means part pertains to use of people whereas the as-an-end part pertains to treatment of people. Finally, I close with a problem even for this, more plausible, version of the scope of the Formula of Humanity.
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Martin Sticker (2022) studied this question.
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