The meaning of questions

Illocutionary force, on the other hand, is 'conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula. Thus we can say I argue that or I warn you that but we cannot say I convince you that or I alarm you that' (103 a ; cf. also 120–21). Moreover, it is possible (73–6) to establish a kind of scale of illocutionary equivocation, ranging from explicitly performative sentences like I permit you to shut it —through sentences with some relatively unambiguous device for indicating IF, such as mood (cf. Shut it, if you like )—to highly ambiguous sentences where the IF is shown only by the non-linguistic circumstances of the utterance, notably simple declaratives. And finally, it is no harder to decide on the IF's of particular utterances than it is to decide on their sense and reference: 'A judge should be able to decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were achieved' (Austin, 121; cf. also 114–15).