Corporate rights and corporate purpose

What constitutional and/or human rights are corporations entitled to claim, if any? The predominant approach to this question models the rights of corporations on natural persons. In so doing, it ignores salient distinctions not only between these two types of agents, but also amongst incorporated entities as diverse as universities, churches, and businesses. As a result, an arts-and-crafts retailer can claim religious freedoms equivalent to a church, and a bank’s freedom of speech can be construed as widely as that of a newspaper. This paper addresses these twin failures by setting out a conception of the corporation that emphasizes its purposive nature. The corporate form is of value primarily insofar as it allows individuals to pursue their ends, values, and life plans in association. Since the corporation’s claim to moral consideration stems from its role in facilitating purposive action in concert, its rights cannot extend beyond what is necessary to fulfil these purposes and must align with each democratic polity’s evaluation of the relative importance of those purposes.