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Case studies explore how precário investors alter irrigation boundaries, indicating shifting power dynamics.
Ostrom posits clear boundaries as the first design principle for successful self-governance of irrigation systems. This neo-institutional theory to craft institutions came to inspire much contemporary water policy. However, defining such boundaries does not pre-empt their contestation and re-negotiation in practice. The article argues that capitalized outsiders can become insiders and insiders can shift the perimeter outwards to multiply rents and profits through modernizing irrigated agriculture. We explore this policy issue through four in-depth case studies from Portugal, where existing irrigation schemes are confronted with outsider investors called precários. The research question we pose is how do precarios emerge, what drives the shifts in irrigation perimeter over time, who benefits and how? The discussion shows how rent-seeking stimulates the outward expansion of perennial cultures outside of the official perimeters. A government resolution in 2019 reversed this trend to one where outsiders became insiders through land acquisition assisted by publicly financed irrigation modernization projects. This allowed public institutions to regain control over irrigation intensification, while precario investors converted their ‘speculative rent’ into tangible gains. Therefore, rent-seeking does not only shift the physical and collective limits of irrigation systems, but also boundaries between public and private.
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Rap et al. (2026) studied this question.
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