What Can Moralogy Teach us About Moral-Exemplar Methodology?

The guiding question of this article is to what extent, if any, Chikuro Hiroike’s (1866–1938) tenets about so-called ortholinons (as moral exemplars), in his general system of moralogy, illuminate problems typically attributed to moral-exemplar methodology and help with their amelioration. I begin with a brief rehearsal of the method of using moral exemplars as motivating role models in moral/character education and its current prominence. I then turn the spotlight to Hiroike’s moralogy in general and his ortholinon principle in particular. Subsequently, I explore this principle in conjunction with historic accounts of great role models (by theorists such as Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, and William James), and recent accounts (by William Damon and Anne Colby, and David Brooks). I look both for areas of complementarity and contrast. I conclude with general remarks about the salience of the ortholinon principle for understanding how learning from moral exemplars can be discriminatory, motivating, and edifying—rather than uncritical, dispiriting, and stupefying. The conclusion is that the ortholinon principle helps us steer away from the problem of mere person-centered hero worship. However, it offers less assistance in forestalling moral inertia.