This study examines the strategic, operational, technological and environmental factors that contributed to the early discontinuation of the Airbus A380 amidst the rise of more sustainable twin-engine jets, such as the Airbus A350 and the Boeing 787. Using a qualitative, multi-lens case study design, it draws on comparative analysis of technical reports, regulatory documents, policy publications and performance data to show how the A380’s high acquisition and operating costs, limited airport compatibility, outdated propulsion systems and elevated emissions per seat-kilometre led to persistent misalignment with shifting industry priorities. By contrast, the A350 and B787 feature modular twin-engine designs, compatibility with sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and adaptability for point-to-point operations. Beyond the aviation context, the research contributes to innovation, strategic management, engineering programme discontinuation and organizational learning literature. Integrating the Technology Life Cycle (TLC), Innovation Diffusion Theory (IDT) and the ‘learning from failure’ perspective, this approach extends the theoretical discourse from adoption to decline in large-scale, capital-intensive programmes. Addressing a gap in engineering disaster studies, it emphasizes long-term strategic, market and regulatory dynamics alongside technical factors. The findings offer transferable guidance: prioritize modularity and upgradeability, align life cycle management with sustainability targets and institutionalize adaptive learning to maintain relevance in an evolving economic and environmental landscape.
Arthur Dela Peña (Sun,) studied this question.