Two adequacy conditions on a minimalist account of truth dependence

According to Aristotle's Categories (14b14–22), the proposition that p is true because p , but it is not the case that p because the proposition that p is true. Call this truth dependence . Truth dependence is challenging for Horwich's minimalism. According to his minimal conception of truth, all there is to truth are the instances of the T‐schema “the proposition that p is true iff p .” If this is an adequate conception of truth, then one might challenge minimalism to explain truth dependence in terms of the instances of the T‐schema. However, unlike truth dependence, the T‐schema neither involves an explanatory asymmetry nor a cross‐categoriality. Many alleged minimalist solutions have been offered to this problem. This article is the first to look at different kinds of alleged solutions: deductive‐nomological , pragmatic , and conceptual . In doing so, the article establishes two adequacy conditions on any Minimalist account of truth dependence: first, account for the explanatory asymmetry and cross‐categoriality of truth dependence , and, second, do so in terms of the instances of (E) . None of the alleged minimalist solutions satisfy these conditions. Thus, we are still in dire need of an adequate minimalist account of truth dependence.