Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This article uncovers the origins of institutionalised commitments in cooperation, revealing their advantages over prior methods through third-party enforcement.
Schelling (1960) and Frank (1988) famously offered commitment as an explanation of the stability of human cooperation in the face of incentives to cheat. Reputationally-enforced commitments were part of the explanation for human cooperation for much of our history (Khan, 2024, 2025). In this article, I consider the origins and effects of institutionalised commitments. These are commitments which are contractually enforced by third parties, rather than only reputationally enforced. I discuss how these commitment offer advantages for securing cooperation over and above our previous forms of commitment. I then offer an account of their potential origins. I suggest that a change in our cooperative landscape and organisational structure occurring in the Neolithic -- in particular, the rise of agricultural economies and hierarchical society -- opened the door to a new means of enforcement for commitments, affecting the success of our cooperative practices.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Saira Rahman Khan (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: