Scientific Objections to Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika Logic

SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIONS TO MADHYAMAKA PRĀSAṄGIKA LOGIC ABSTRACT This work critically analyzes some of the central logical assumptions of the Madhyamaka Prāsaṅgika school from a contemporary scientific perspective. It is argued that certain key principles — such as findability under analysis, exhaustiveness of part-whole relations, and logical bivalence — are not necessarily universal and can be questioned in light of developments in physics, systems theory, and scientific epistemology. MAIN OBJECTIONS 1. Findability vs. Existence: The Madhyamaka criterion that what is inherent must be findable under ultimate analysis is not standard in science, where non-identifiability is interpreted as redundancy or invariance, not as ontological non-existence. 2. Part-Whole Exhaustiveness: The negation of classical mereological relations does not imply non-existence, since there exist structural relations (symmetries, invariants, topology) not reducible to the part-whole schema. 3. Bivalence and Identity: The identity/difference dichotomy is not universal in non-classical frameworks (quantum indistinguishability, non-bivalent logics, contextual identity). 4. Dependence and Ontology: Dependence implies non-independence, not necessarily inherent non-existence. The notion of inherent existence is more restrictive than mere independence. 5. The Subject: The unfindability of the subject may reflect non-objectifiability, not non-existence. The domain of analysis may not be closed with respect to its conditions of possibility. 6. Emptiness of Emptiness: A tension persists between explanatory capacity and absence of grounding. FORMAL RESULT A reformulation of emptiness is introduced in terms of identifiability and invariance: θ ~ θ' ⇔ P(Y|θ) = P(Y|θ') The relevant space is the quotient space Θ/G of equivalence classes, where parametric non-uniqueness implies empirical indistinguishability, but not ontological non-existence. CONCLUSION The disagreement between Madhyamaka and contemporary science is not empirical but meta-theoretical: two distinct interpretations of the same formal structure (negative ontological vs. structural-relational). Madhyamaka's most solid contribution is best understood as a critique of the reification of particular descriptions, rather than as a general denial of all forms of existence. KEYWORDS Madhyamaka, Prāsaṅgika, Emptiness, śūnyatā, Philosophy of science, Structural realism, Identifiability, Non-classical logic, Quantum philosophy, Emergence, Metaphysics, Buddhist philosophy, Invariance theory