Silence or Solidarity? The Political Pitfalls of an LGBTQI Avoidance Strategy in Hungary

Amid rising illiberal anti-LGBTQI backlash, some opposition politicians fear that resisting it is a political trap that could jeopardize their electoral fortunes. We evaluate this concern in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government passed a law banning Pride marches. The leading opposition figure, Péter Magyar of Tisza, initially avoided opposing the law, ostensibly to protect his party’s future electoral prospects. In a May 2025 survey experiment, we find that this “avoidance” strategy reduces Magyar’s approval while failing to increase support for his party. Theoretically, we conceptualize a value-credibility cost mechanism through which elite silence diminishes moral authority, cedes issue ownership, and weakens support for LGBTQI rights. Our results, buttressed by interviews with LGBTQI organizers, contribute to a literature on the costs and benefits of minority rights inclusion in electoral strategy.