Conclusions

ConclusionsThis study analyzed the persistent electoral volatility in Turkey in terms of partysystem institutionalization mainly during the 1961-2002 period.In order to distinguish the different vote swings underlying the electoral volatility, the author divided electoral volatility into: (1) cleavage-type volatilities based on social cleavages; and(2) retrospective-type volatilities based on voter punishment of the incumbent.The two types of volatilities were analyzed using two separate regression models.The results showed, first, that deep social cleavages increased electoral volatility in the past, but that since the 1990s, they have begun to stabilize voting behavior.The party system in Turkey has thus recently become anchored into its major social cleavages.Second, electoral volatility as a whole remained high because of a growing trend toward retrospective voting.Low economic growth and high unemployment were the major reasons for this.In sum, the apparent instability in the party system stemmed not from a lack of representation in parliament of major social groups but from the poor performance of the government.This chapter first summarizes the major arguments and findings of the preceding chapters and, second, draws some conclusions that may help to answer the questions raised in the introductory chapter.Finally, the implications and limitations of this study are discussed.