This document addresses principal objections to Meta-Originary Ontology, suggesting important philosophical implications.
This document responds to twelve categories of principal objections to Meta-Originary Ontology (MOO). It is a companion to MOO 2.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19351059), published separately by design: the framework does not carry its critics inside itself. Objection types addressed: Whitehead (2), Hegel (2), analytic philosophy (3), the foundation question of consciousness-as-primary (1), structural isomorphism, psychological projection, non-uniqueness, normative smuggling, and excessive elegance. One genuine weakness is acknowledged without deflection. Published in English and Chinese.
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Chen et al. (2026) studied this question.
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