Strategic misrepresentation in personality testing: An experimental study using the public goods game

Personality tests are commonly used to hire suitable employees but this process is susceptible to strategic misrepresentation by job-seekers. This article uses a lab experiment as an analogy of such a hiring process by using a repeated public goods game (PGG) as a proxy for a cooperative work environment. Participants first complete a Big Five personality test, focusing on the trait of ‘Agreeableness’, which some previous studies have associated with prosocial cooperation in the PGG. Two groups are formed: a high Agreeableness group and a low Agreeableness group. The experiment manipulates the timing of revealing the group formation rule, as knowing the rule before the personality test allows for misrepresentation of Agreeableness. I find no evidence of substantial misrepresentation when the group formation rule is revealed before the personality test. I do find that Agreeableness group formation increases contributions for both high and low groups, but only when it is described to participants before the PGG. I find no evidence that Agreeableness is related to contributions in the PGG.