In an address to General Assembly on 12 September 2002, delivered fifteen minutes before President Bush's statement on Iraq, secretary-general (SG) made it clear that he believed new military action against Iraq should occur only on basis of a new Security Council (SC) resolution. Without stating explicitly that such authorization was necessary, he suggested that respect for international and unique legitimacy provided by UN required it. He added, however, that should Iraq continue to defy its obligations, SC face its responsibilities, implying that it must be prepared to threaten or authorize use of force. (1) A year earlier, in August 2001, SC adopted a little noticed resolution on conflict prevention, which invites SG to refer cases of serious violations of international law to SC. (2) The request would seem to fly in face of a decision taken in 1945 not to empower SG to bring to attention of SC violations of legal instrument that bears most directly on its work--the Charter itself. (3) While SG was expected and encouraged to perform independent political functions, UN's founders did not anoint him guardian of charter. And yet, with little fanfare, resolution 1366 seems to call upon him to play precisely that role with respect to charter and much charter-based law. These two events--the SG's intervention in debate over military action in Iraq and invitation in Resolution 1366--highlight an important and poorly understood dimension of role of SG. In addition to being chief administrative officer of and world's top diplomat, he is an influential participant in legal discourse that infuses much of global politics. Despite defeat of proposed amendment to Article 99, this is a role SG has played (and could not help but play) since earliest days of UN. He is a key member of an interpretive community associated with implementation and elaboration of charter-based law. With little formal authority and no material power, SG's influence depends largely on his persuasive powers. (4) That influence, moreover, is wielded within an institutional and normative context that he helps shape. By examining SG's role as a legal actor, this article aims to shed light on sources of those persuasive powers. I argue that political and legal roles of SG are intertwined, and that his political influence is reinforced by his ability to draw upon values and principles embodied in Charter. I begin by reviewing legal basis of SG's authority and evolving conceptions of that authority under successive secretaries-general. I then offer a brief account of international as a process of justificatory discourse, terms of which are set and constrained by an interpretive community associated with a particular field of practice. As a participant in practice of peace and security, SG contributes to interpretation, hardening, and progressive elaboration of charter-based in that field. In third section, I examine how various SGs have intervened in legal discourse and argue that voice of office carries considerable weight. The article concludes by summarizing sources of secretary-general's persuasive powers, laying stress on what may be called normative authority of office. The Secretary-General as Legal Actor The legal basis for secretary-general's role lies in Articles 7 and 97 through 101 of Charter. Article 97 names him chief administrative officer of organization; Article 98 stipulates that he shall perform functions entrusted to him by deliberative organs of UN. More interesting from a constitutional point of view is independent political role derived from Article 99, which reads: the Secretary-General may bring to attention of Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten maintenance of international peace and security. …
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Ian Johnstone (2003) studied this question.
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