In recent years, the European Union (EU) has introduced several measuresintended to safeguard European economic security. We argue that variationin the distributional effects of these measures explains why some of themreceive more support from business actors and others less. In turn, thebalance of business support and opposition affects how much controversywe see about these policies and how easily they get adopted. We test ourargument using three cases: the revision of the EU regulation on foreigndirect investment screening, the introduction of outbound investmentscreening, and subsidies for the semiconductor industry. Using evidence frominterviews, European Commission consultations, and other sources, we findsupport for our argument. We conclude that business actors heavily shapehow the EU reacts to geopolitical challenges and suggest that this mattersfor the effectiveness of the EU’s economic security policy. This emphasis onthe role of business interests contributes to research on geoeconomics andEU external relations.
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Dür et al. (2025) studied this question.
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