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Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of credal states. Both assume we can make cognitive progress in an inquiry even while falling short of the target. I show that the prospects for combining these two programmes are bleak. A core accuracy principle, proximity, that is universally embraced within the truthlikeness programme turns out to be incompatible with a central principle within the epistemic utility programme, namely propriety. 1. Truthlikeness and Epistemic Utility2. Inquiries3. Accuracy for Propositions4. Proximity5. Accuracy for Credal States6. Propriety7. Proximity for Credal States8. Extensionality9. Admissible Weightings10. Propriety Violates Proximity11. Possible Responses 11.1. Retreat to convexity11.2. Reject boundedness11.3. Reject additivity12. The Upshot
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Graham Oddie (2017) studied this question.
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