The role of the second chambers of federal parliaments in the legislative process is elucidated in this study through a comparative analysis of twenty federations. There are three primary areas of participation by these chambers in lawmaking: the introduction of bills in the chamber, the discussion and adoption of laws, and the coordination of the positions of the chambers on controversial bills. The first part of the article concludes that in most federations, bills can be submitted to either of the chambers. Exceptions may arise based upon the nature of the bill, the issues to be resolved, and the subject of a right of legislative initiative. The possibility of introducing a bill initially in the second chamber indicates equality of the chambers in this particular aspect, although it does not determine the quality of the bills. The second part of the article considers three aspects of the role of the second chambers in the legislative process. Various approaches to legislative protection for the subjects of the federation are analyzed: (1) by their representatives in the upper house during discussion and adoption of laws, (2) through the direct participation of subjects of the federation in federal-level lawmaking by submission of their bills in the chamber, and (3) by exercising the right to approve certain bills adopted by parliament. In ethnic federations, the ethno-linguistic factor significantly impacts the legislative process and the role of the second chamber. Inconsistency in the opposition between the chambers in different systems is seen to be dependent on the method of their formation and the nature of political representation. The third part of the article reveals reasons for disagreements between the chambers on draft laws: a discrepancy between national and regional interests, the clash of interests among various political groups and their reflection in the activities of the chambers, differing understandings by both chambers about society’s needs for specific bills and their content, and the veto power of one chamber over a bill submitted by the other chamber. The article characterizes the suspensive veto as a tool that opens up the possibility of joint discussion and a compromise solution by the chambers. It discusses the justifications for an absolute veto in the event of a complete rejection of the bill by the second chamber, as well as in a case when, after rejection by the chamber, a compromise is reached with the help of additional procedures. The experience of federations leads to the conclusion that due to the vastly different historical conditions of the formation and functioning of federal states, a single universal model of the role of the second chamber in the legislative process is impossible. However, this does not exclude the possibility of selectively borrowing individual elements, especially organizational-technical ones, from the experience of other federations.
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Midkhat Farukshin (2024) studied this question.
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