Rivers as persons: intrinsic value, capabilities and representation

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether and why rivers should be recognised as legal persons from an ecocentric perspective grounded in intrinsic value. It argues that the key challenge is not only whether legal personhood can be extended to rivers, but how river personhood can be designed so that representatives genuinely defend rivers’ own interests. By focusing on rivers’ “capabilities” (to hold rights, have interests, possess a representable will, and stand in court), this paper clarifies what river-focused personhood must achieve in practice. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a doctrinal and conceptual methodology. It reassesses classic and contemporary theories of legal personhood (legalist and metaphysical; interest and will theories) alongside recent Rights of Nature and “rights of rivers” scholarship. These conceptual debates are tested against leading examples of river personhood and related initiatives, including Ganga/Yamuna, Whanganui, Ecuador’s constitutional Rights of Nature and litigation concerning the Niger Delta. A capabilities-based framework is developed to connect foundations of river personhood with questions of representation, standing and enforcement. Findings The paper finds that river personhood is best justified by rivers’ intrinsic value and capabilities. Properly understood, rivers can be rights-holders because they have morally significant interests and a will that can be represented. However, the effectiveness of river personhood depends on how representatives and institutional arrangements are designed. Without mandates tied to rivers’ intrinsic value, personhood risks remaining symbolic, reproducing anthropocentric, extractive patterns rather than transforming relationships with rivers. Research limitations/implications The analysis is primarily doctrinal and theoretical. Future research should examine how different guardian models, governance arrangements and community-led practices function in particular river contexts, and how they interact with existing property, resource and administrative regimes. The capabilities-based framework proposed here can guide such empirical work and comparative studies across river systems. Practical implications This paper has practical implications for legislators, courts and policymakers. The paper provides a structured way to design river personhood regimes. It shows that guardians and representatives must be selected, authorised and resourced in ways that reflect rivers’ intrinsic value and identified interests, rather than merely reproducing existing priorities. The analysis highlights the importance of clear standing rules, independent guardianship, training for judges and representatives. These can inform the drafting, interpretation and reform of Rights of Nature and river statutes. Social implications Recognising rivers as legal persons reshapes social relationships between human and nature. This paper suggests that river personhood can enhance environmental justice by making rivers’ interests visible in law and opening spaces for communities, including Indigenous peoples and river-dependent groups, to act as custodial representatives. At the same time, it warns that poorly designed charters or laws may entrench existing power imbalances or sideline local knowledges. A capabilities and intrinsic-value approach supports more inclusive and relational models of decision-making about rivers. Originality/value This paper shifts the debate from the question of whether rivers can be legal persons to how river personhood should be grounded and structured. Its originality lies in combining an ecocentric account of intrinsic value with a capabilities-based framework (rights, interests, representable will, standing) that directly informs the design of representation and guardianship. By systematically linking personhood theory, Rights of Nature practice and the practicalities of enforcement, the paper offers a distinctive, river-focused contribution to ongoing legal and socio-legal debates.